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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by MBNA America Bank, N.A. (hereinafter "MBNA"), to
confirm arbitration awards. Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 7-911, an arbitration award
may only be confirmed if there was a contractual agreement between the parties
providing that any dispute arising between the parties will be resolved by arbitration.
Both the Appellants in this action, David F. Capps and Miriam G. Carroll (hereinafter
"Capps and Carroll"), have argued that they did not agree to arbitration. Further, Capps
and Carroll have also argued that the laws of the State of Idaho control the dispute, and
not the laws of the State of Delaware. MBNA has argued that the laws of the State of
Delaware control and that MBNA has properly exercised its right to unilaterally amend
the agreement under Delaware law.

B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
MBNA filed an arbitration claim against each of the Appellants with the National
Arbitration Forum (hereinafter "NAF"). Capps (R. Vol. I, p.140-43) and Carroll (R. Vol.
I, p. 138-9) both timely objected in writing to the arbitration proceeding based on no
agreement to arbitrate. MBNA and the NAF arbitrator proceeded over the objections of
Capps and Carroll. Capps and Carroll did not participate in the arbitration proceedings.
The NAF issued an award letter against Capps (R. Vol. II, p. 389) and against Carroll (R.
Vol. I, p. 16). Carroll filed suit against MBNA on September 30, 2005 (case CV 36747 R. Vol. I, p. l -7 and p. 8-14) after receiving the award letter and Capps filed suit against
MBNA on November 3, 2005 (case CV-36827), both within the 90 day time limit
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specified in Idaho Code Section 7-912(b ), seeking to have the award letters vacated.
MBNA filed to confirm the award letter against Capps through Wilson & McColl,
Attorneys at Law in Boise, Idaho, on January 17, 2006 (case CV-2006-5, filed in Lewis
County (R. Vol. I, p. 386-89), which became CV-37201 when transferred to Idaho
County). MBNA also filed to confirm the award letter against Carroll through Bishop,
White & Marshall, Attorneys at Law in Seattle Washington on June 6, 2006 (case CV37320 - R. Vol. II, p. 398). MBNA filed for Summary Judgment against each of the
Appellants, which was denied (R. Vol. I, p. 20-35). On April 20, 2006 the cases (CV36747 and CV-36827) against MBNA by Capps and Carroll were combined into case
CV-36747 (R. Vol. II, p.390).
The District Court held a hearing on the issue of whether there was an agreement to
arbitrate. Following the Court's decision on September 14, 2006 (R. Vol I, p. 100-109)
that there was an agreement to arbitrate and confirming the award letters, Capps and
Carroll filed a Rule l l(a) LR.C.P. Motion for Reconsideration, followed by an amended
Motion for Reconsideration on October 10, 2006 (R. Vol. I, p.110-129), which was
ultimately denied on November 9, 2007 (R. Vol. I, p. 338-358). The confirmation case
against Capps (CV-37201) was consolidated into the combined case, and post judgment,
on December 7, 2007, the confirmation case against Carroll (CV-37320) was also
consolidated into the combined case (R. Vol. I, p. 367). Capps and Carroll then appealed
the District Court's decision that there was an agreement to arbitrate on November 15,
2007 (R. Vol. I, p. 359-366), and subsequently filed an Amended Notice ofinterlocutory
Appeal on December 7, 2007 (R. Vol. I, p. 368-375).
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C. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Carroll opened a credit card account with MBNA on March 15, 1980 (R. Vol. I, p.
36-7). Capps opened a credit card account with MBNA on February 20, 1999 (R. Vol I.
p. 73-4). Carroll provided an affidavit stating that she did not agree to arbitrate any
dispute with MBNA and that the original agreement between Carroll and MBNA did not
contain an agreement to arbitrate (R. Vol. I, p. 37, L.5-9). Capps provided an affidavit
stating that he did not agree to arbitrate any dispute with MBNA and that the original
agreement between Capps and MBNA did not contain an agreement to arbitrate (R. Vol.
I, p. 74, L.5-9). It is undisputed that the original credit card agreement did not contain an
arbitration clause requiring the parties to arbitrate any claims.
MBNA claims to have unilaterally amended the credit card agreement in January
of2000 to include a clause requiring any and all claims to be subject to arbitration with
the NAF. Capps and Carroll claim to have not received any notification of arbitration
and did not agree to any form of arbitration (R. Vol. I, p. 37, L. 7-8, and p. 74, L. 7-8).
MBNA did not produce the original agreement, nor did MBNA include an agreement
when filing for confirmation of the arbitration award letters against either Capps or
Carroll as required by the Federal Arbitration Act [FAA] in Title 9 U.S.C. § 13. It is
undisputed that the transactions involved in this action are for a consumer purpose.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
ISSUE NO.1
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT A DELAWARE CHOICE
OF LAW PROVISION WAS VALID IN IDAHO CONSUMER CREDIT
CONTRACTS?

ISSUE NO. 2
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS AN
AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE WITHOUT A "MEETING OF THE MINDS?

ISSUE NO. 3
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DECIDING THAT DELAWARE LAW
CONTROLLED THE DISPUTE?

ISSUE NO. 4
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING IN FAVOR OF MBNA WHEN
THE APPLICATION FOR CONFIRMATION OF AN ARBITRATION
AW ARD WAS DEFECTIVE WHEN FILED?

ISSUE NO. 5
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE ARBITRATION
PROVISION, WHICH WAS ADDED BY A NEGATIVE OPTION WITHOUT
EFFECTIVE NOTICE, DID NOT VIOLATE BASIC CONTRACT
PRINCIPLES, AND WAS SUBSTANTIALLY AND PROCEDURALLY
CONSCIONABLE?

4

ISSUE NO. 6
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ALLOWING CAPPS' AND CARROLL'S
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY
(CONCERNING THE ORIGINAL DISPUTE) TO BEWAIVED THROUGH A
"NEGATIVE OPTION" WITHOUT CAPPS AND CARROLL BOTH
KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY CONSENTING TO
THE WAIVER?
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ARGUMENT I

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT A DELAWARE CHOICE
OF LAW PROVISION WAS VALID IN IDAHO CONSUMER CREDIT
CONTRACTS?
A. INTRODUCTION.

This is an action brought by MBNA to confirm arbitration awards. Pursuant to Idaho
Code Section 7-911, an arbitration award may only be confirmed if there was a
contractual agreement between the parties providing that any dispute arising between the
parties will be resolved by arbitration. Both Capps and Carroll have stated in affidavits
that they did not agree to arbitration (R. Vol. I, p. 37 and 74). Further, Capps and Carroll
have also argued that the laws of the State ofidaho control the dispute, and not the laws
of the State of Delaware. MBNA has argued that the laws of the State of Delaware
control and that MBNA has properly exercised its right to amend the agreement
unilaterally under Delaware law.
B. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW

When questions of law are presented, the Supreme Court exercises free review and is
not bound by findings of the district court, but is free to draw its own conclusions from
the evidence presented. Accomazzo v. CEDU Educational Services, Inc., 135 Idaho 145,
15P.3dl153.
The construction and application of a statute or statutes present pure questions of law,
which are freely reviewed on appeal. Wilder v. Miller, 135 Idaho 382, 17 P.3d 883.
Review of an arbitrator's award is limited to whether any of the grounds for relief
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stated in the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) exist. Idaho Code§ 7-912(2004);
Pac. Alaska Seafoods, Inc. v. Vic Hoskins Trucking Inc., 139 Idaho 472,474, 80 P.3d
1073, I 075 (2003).
C. THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE

The State of Idaho has a public policy of protecting its residents against unfair
practices by some suppliers of credit, having due regard for the interests of legitimate and
scrupulous creditors (Idaho Code Section 28-41-102). Specifically, the Idaho Credit
Code states, (J.C. 28-41-102) (See also R. Vol. I, p. 205, L. 21-26)
"( 1) This act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying
purpose and policies." That "(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this act
are:" ... "(c) To protect debtors against unfair practices by some suppliers of
credit, having due regard for the interests of legitimate and scrupulous creditors;"
Pursuant to the Idaho Credit Code: (See also R. Vol. I, p. 204, L. 5-9)
"28-41-204, APPLICABILITY. This act shall apply only to credit transactions
for a consumer purpose, except for the following parts, chapters and sections,
which shall apply to credit transactions for any and all purposes: (1) Part 1,
Chapter 41, Title 28, Idaho Code."

It is undisputed tbat the transactions involved in this action are for a consumer
purpose.
The Idaho Credit Code states (See also R. Vol. I, p. 204, L. 20-29),
"28-41-201. TERRITORIAL APPLICATION. (1) Except as otherwise provided in
this section, this act applies to sales and loans made in this state and to modifications,
including refinancing, consolidations, and deferrals, made in this state, of sales and
loans, wherever made. For purposes of this act a sale, loan, or modification of a sale
or loan is made in this state if: ... (b) A consumer who is a resident of this state enters
into the transaction with a creditor who has solicited or advertised in this state by any
means including, but not limited to, mail, brochure, telephone, print, radio, television,
internet or any other electronic means." (Emphasis added).

MBNA has entered into the State of Idaho, advertised by print, television, internet
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and other means, and has solicited and conducted business with Idaho residents in the
State ofidaho. Capps and Carroll were both residents of the State ofidaho when MBNA
claims to have unilaterally amended the credit card agreement. These facts are
uncontested and subject MBNA to the conditions of the Idaho Credit Code.
The trial court issued the following statement in its September 14, 2006
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER (R. Vol. I, p. 107, L. 8-15),
The original credit card agreement in this case contained a choice of law clause
under which the parties agreed that Delaware law would govern any issues arising
concerning the contract. Under choice of law principles articulated in the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § I 45 and accepted by the Idaho
Supreme Court, Idaho courts give effect to such choice of law provisions unless
that chosen forum has no significant relation to the parties or unless the law
chosen violates some fundamental public policy ofidaho. Seubert Excavators,
Inc. v. Anderson Logging Co., 126 Idaho 648,651,889 P.2d 82, 85 (1995) (citing
Johnson v. Pischke, I 08 Idaho 397, 400, 700 P.2d 19, 22 (1985)). Neither of
those two conditions is met in this case. (Emphasis added).
The trial court based its decision that Delaware law controlled on a choice of law
clause in the alleged agreement. Even if there was a choice of law provision in the
original credit card agreement, tbe Idaho Credit Code provides: (See also R. Vol. I, p.
205, L. 11-15)
"28-41-201(8) Except as provided in subsection (7) of this section, the following
agreements by a buyer or debtor are invalid with respect to regulated credit sales,
regulated loans, or modifications thereof, to which this act applies: (a) That the
law of another state shall apply." (Emphasis added).

Subsection (7) exempts the transaction if the buyer or debtor is not a resident of this state,
which does not apply in this case.
Capps and Carro 11 argued during the original hearing that the laws and the actions of
MBNA under their interpretation of Delaware law was against the public policy of Idaho.

8

In Bakker v. Thunder SprinQ-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 108 P.3d 332 (2005), the
Supreme Court of Idaho held,
"[3-6] Whether a contract violates public policy is a question of law for the court to
determine from all the facts and circumstances of each case. Quiring v. Quiring, 13 0
[daho 560, 566, 944 P.2d 695, 701 (1997) (citing Sterns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276,
283, 240 P.2d 833, 840 (1952)). Public policy may be found and set forth in the
statutes, judicial decisions or the constitution. Quiring, 130 Idaho at 566, 944 P.2d at
701."
There is a public policy in Idaho case law against unilateral amendments to
agreements. Idaho does not recognize unilateral amendments to contracts or agreements.
In Yellowpine Water User's Ass'n v. Imel, 105 Idaho 349,670 P.2d 54, the Idaho
Supreme Court held;
"One party cannot unilaterally change the terms of a contract and attempts to add
terms without the consent of all parties are ineffectual."
MBNA's interpretation that Delaware law provides for unilateral amendments to credit
card contracts violates the fundamental public policy ofidaho regarding unilateral
amendments.
There is also a public poliey in Idaho case law against forming agreements without a
true "meeting of the minds". In Gulf Employees Federal Credit Union v. Williams, 107
Idaho 890, 693 P .2d 1092, the Idaho Supreme Court held,
"No enforceable contract exists unless it reflects a meeting of the minds and
embodies a distinct understanding common to both parties."
MBNA's interpretation that Delaware law allows modifications to credit card contracts
by mailing a notice to cardholders in the same envelope as the monthly statement violates
the fundamental public policy of Idaho regarding the necessity of a true "meeting of the
minds."
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There is no meeting of the minds regarding arbitration between Capps, Carroll
and MBNA. Carroll has provided her affidavit (R. Vol. I, p. 311 - 312) stating, "7. That
I have never voluntarily, knowingly or intelligently agreed to arbitration with MBNA
America Bank at any time." and "8. That to the best of my knowledge there is no
agreement to arbitrate this dispute, or any dispute, with MBNA America Bank." Capps
has also provided his affidavit (R. Vol. I, p. 314 - 315) stating, "7. That I have never
voluntarily, knowingly or intelligently agreed to arbitration with MBNA America Bank at
any time." and "8. That to the best of my knowledge there is no agreement to arbitrate
this dispute, or any dispute, with MBNA America Bank."
Capps and Carroll specifically asked MBNA in discovery "Interrogatory No. 7:
State the evidence you have and/or will use at trial to prove the Plaintiff had knowledge
of the alleged Arbitration Agreement." (R. Vol. I, p. 50). MBNA's answer was,
"Testimony of Greg Canapp; account records, including the card agreement; and the
credit card account statements." There was no evidence whatsoever regarding any
knowledge of an arbitration provision on the part of Capps and Carroll provided by Greg
Canapp or MBNA. In the District Court's MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
dated May 24, 2006, the Court noted (R. Vol. I, p. 25-26),
"The affidavits of Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps state that there was no agreement to
arbitrate and that they were unaware of any attempt by MBNA Bank to amend
their original credit card agreement to obtain one. Gregory Canapp, a Senior
Personal Banking Officer at MBNA Bank, states that there was an agreement and
purports to attach a copy of the current operative agreement and copies of
monthly statements. No such documents are attached, a fact noted by Ms. Carroll
and Mr. Capps in their briefs in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
MBNA Bank has taken no steps to remedy this situation."
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Clearly there is no actual evidence of any knowledge or agreement on the part of Capps
and Carroll to arbitrate this or any dispute with MBNA. There is not, and never has been,
a meeting of the minds regarding arbitration between Capps, Carroll and MBNA. There
was no distinct understanding regarding arbitration between the parties. Therefore no
enforceable agreement regarding arbitration exists.
Capps and Carroll also brought the Idaho Credit Code before the trial court during
reconsideration, demonstrating that Idaho had a strong statutory public policy against
using the Jaws of another state in consumer credit contracts. The trial court's response in
its November 7, 2007 MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER and its November 8,
2007 AMENDED MEMORAMDUM DECISION AND ORDER was,

"In my Memorandum Decision and Order of September 14, 2006, I held that
using the Delaware choice of law clause did not violate Idaho's choice of law
principles. I am not persuaded that decision was wrong. Because I find I did not
err in applying Delaware's law, I do not address Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll's
discussion of the Idaho Credit Code." (R. Vol. I, p. 336, L. 2-7 and p. 357, L. 510 respectively).
In Kirkham v. 4.60 Acres of Land, 100 Idaho 781,784,605 P.2d 959,962 (1980)
the court stated,
"However, it is generally held that the trial court abuses its discretion when it fails
or refuses to properly apply the law."
While Capps and Carroll initially believed that Delaware law would apply, they
gradually came to the realization that MBNA's reliance on its interpretation of Delaware
law was creating injustice across the country. MBNA claims that since Capps and
Carroll initially believed that Delaware law controlled the dispute, Capps and Carroll
have waived any right to raise the issue that Idaho law actually controls the dispute.
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The [daho Credit Code also provides in 28-41-106(1) (See also R. Vol. I, p. 203, L. !O-

Ii),
"Except as otherwise provided in this act, a debtor may not waive or agree to forego
rights or benefits under this act."
In Ting v. AT&T, 182 F.Supp.2d 902, 912 (N.D.Cal. 2002) the court evaluated the
Lake-Snell survey (included in this case (R. Vol. I, p. 245-275) as a demonstration that
the notification scheme for the addition of the arbitration provision is ineffective). The
Ting court stated, (at 28, p. 912)
"While [ attach less weight to the responses to questions 2-3 and 11, since the form of
the questions could have been improved, I could not ignore the clear trend of these
answers, which indicate that people are unlikely to read solicitations received in the
mail, even if from AT&T. Nor could I ignore their consistency with the results of
AT &T's research."
The conclusion of the Lake-Snell survey, regarding the arbitration provision, stated, (R.
Vol. I, p. 249, L. 3-8)
"Finally, even after being reminded of the agreement, customers overwhelmingly
believe they have not agreed to this provision. Ninety-four percent of customers
say they have not agreed to this provision or are unsure (74 percent haven't
agreed, 20 percent don't know). Only six percent of customers think they have
agreed to this provision. Across demographic groups nearly nine out of ten
customers say they have not agreed to this provision."
AT&T' s notice of the arbitration provision was mailed in a separate envelope, most of
which were marked "Important Notice". MBNA, by mailing ont their notice of the
arbitration provision as a bill stuffer, even though authorized by a Delaware statute, either
knew, or should have known, that its notice would not be seen by a vast majority of its
customers. Reliance on the bill stuffer notice for the arbitration provision as authorized
under Delaware law is unfair and unscrupulous. The Idaho Credit Code was created to
protect Idaho's citizens from just this kind of practice. This method of giving notice of
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the arbitration provision, which does not require any recognition or acknowledgment to
waive a substantive, constitutionally protected right, violates the fundamental public
policy of the State of!daho.
Any agreement that the laws of another state will apply is invalid under the Idaho
Credit Code. The debtor cannot waive bis or her rights to protection under the Idaho
Credit Code. The wording of the statute is clear and unambiguous. In addition, the
choice of Delaware law violates at least three (3) public policies of the State ofldaho.
For the trial court to conclude that Delaware law applies is clearly reversible error.
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ARGUMENT II.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS AN
AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE WITHOUT A "MEETING OF THE MINDS?"
A. INTRODUCTION

This is an action brought by MBNA to confirm arbitration awards. MBNA claims
to have unilaterally amended the cardholder agreement under the laws of Delaware to
include an arbitration provision. Capps and Carroll have argued that the laws of the
State ofldaho apply, not the laws of the State of Delaware. Capps and Carroll have
also argued that there is no "meeting of the minds" on arbitration and that MBNA has
provided no proof of a "meeting of the minds" regarding arbitration.
B. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW

Review of an arbitrator's award is limited to whether any of the grounds for relief
stated in the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) exist. Idaho Code§ 7-912(2004);
Pac. Alaska Seafoods, Inc. v. Vic Hoskins Trucking Inc., 139 Idaho 472,474, 80 P.3d
1073, 1075 (2003).
C. A MEETING OF THE MINDS IS REQUIRED FOR AN AGREEMENT TO
EXIST

In Gulf Employees Federal Credit Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho 890, 693 P.2d
I 092, the Idaho Supreme Court held,
"No enforceable contract exists unless it reflects a meeting of the minds and
embodies a distinct understanding common to both parties."
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There is no meeting of the minds regarding arbitration between Capps, Carroll and
MBNA. Carroll has provided her affidavit (R. Vol. I, p. 311- 312) stating, "7. That I
have never voluntarily, knowingly or intelligently agreed to arbitration with MBNA
America Bank at any time." and "8. That to the best ofmy knowledge there is no
agreement to arbitrate this dispute, or any dispute, with MBNA America Bank." Capps
has also provided his affidavit (R. Vol. I, p. 314 - 315) stating, "7. That I have never
voluntarily, knowingly or intelligently agreed to arbitration with MBNA America Bank at
any time." and "8. That to the best of my knowledge there is no agreement to arbitrate
this dispute, or any dispute, with MBNA America Bank."
Capps and Carroll specifically asked MBNA in discovery "Interrogatory No. 7:

'

State the evidence you have and/or will use at trial to prove the Plaintiff had knowledge
of the alleged Arbitration Agreement." (R. Vol. I, p. 50). MBNA's answer was,
"Testimony of Greg Canapp; account records, including the card agreement; and the
credit card account statements." There was no evidence whatsoever regarding any
knowledge of an arbitration provision on the part of Capps and Carroll provided by Greg
Canapp or MBNA. fn the District Court's MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
dated May 24, 2006, the Court noted (R. Vol. I, p. 25-26),
"The afiidavits of Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps state tl1at there was no agreement to
arbitrate and that they were unaware of any attempt by MBNA Bank to amend
their original credit card agreement to obtain one. Gregory Canapp, a Senior
Personal Banking Officer at MBNA Bank, states that there was an agreement and
purports to attach a copy of the current operative agreement and copies of
monthly statements. No such documents are attached, a fact noted by Ms. Carroll
and Mr. Capps in their briefa in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
MBNA Bank has taken no steps to remedy this situation."
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Even in Delaware, a "meeting of the minds" is required and a clear understanding of
the agreement is necessary. In Hieman Abner & Goldlust v. Ingram, C.A. No. 96C-05047, SUPERIOR COURT OF DELAWARE, KENT, 1998 Del. Super. LEXIS 251, April
23, 1998, the Delaware court held that,
"[2] It is of course, elementary that where a contract is sought to be made in the
form of an offer and an acceptance, there is no meeting of the minds unless the
acceptance is of the identical thing offered." (See also Mesa Partners v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., Civil action No. 7871, COURT OF CHANCERY OF
DELAWARE, NEW CASTLE, 488 A.2d 107; 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 540; and
Martin Newark Dealership, Inc., v. Grube, C.A. No. 97-11-064 COURT OF
COMMON PLEAS OF DELA WARE, NEW CASTLE, 1998 Del.C.P. LEXIS 2).

Because there was, and is, no meeting of the minds regarding arbitration, there is no
agreement to arbitrate this, or any, dispute between Capps, Carroll and MBNA.
Clearly there is no actual evidence of any knowledge or agreement on the part of Capps
and Carroll to arbitrate this or any dispute with MBNA. There is not, and never has been,
a meeting of the minds regarding arbitration between Capps, Carroll and MBNA. There
was no distinct understanding regarding arbitration between the parties. Therefore no
enforceable agreement regarding arbitration exists. The trial court committed reversible
error in deciding otherwise.
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ARGUMENT III.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT DELA WARE LAW
CONTROLLED THE DISPUTE?

A.

INTRODUCTION
The only choice of law provision presented by MBNA was in an alleged cardholder

agreement other than the original. The only arbitration provision presented was also in
an alleged cardholder agreement other than the original. No testimony or evidence was
presented as to why the original was not available. No testimony or evidence was
presented stating that the alleged agreement was the same as the original or that the
original agreement authorized any changes or substitution by another agreement. No
testimony or evidence was presented stating that the original cardholder agreement
contained an arbitration provision. No testimony was presented stating that the original
agreement included a Delaware choice of law provision.

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly
erroneous. . . . On appeal, this Court examines the record to see if challenged
findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Thomas v.
Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 637-38, 132 P.3d 392, 394-95 (2006)(citation omitted).
C. MBNA DID NOT PLACE THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT ON THE COURT

RECORD
Under Rule 1002 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, the original cardholder agreement is
required.

17

"To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing,
recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules
or by statute."
Under Rule 1003, Idaho Rules of Evidence,
"A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine
question is raised as to the authenticity or continuing effectiveness of the original or
(2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the
original."
MBNA presented no evidence or testimony proving that the cardholder agreement
offered by MBNA was in fact a duplicate of the original cardholder agreement. Capps
and Carroll provided affidavits stating that the original _cardholder agreement did not
contain an arbitration provision (R. Vol. I, p. 36-7 and 73-4) thus raising a genuine
question as to the authenticity of the alleged cardholder agreement presented by MBNA.
The fact that the original cardholder agreement did not contain an arbitration
provision is uncontested by MBNA. MBNA provided no evidence or testimony that the
original cardholder agreement was amended according to the terms and conditions of the
original agreement.
Under Rule l 004 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence,
"Admissibility of other evidence of contents. The original is not required, and
other evidence of the contents of a writing, recording, or photograph is admissible
if:

( l) Originals lost or destroyed. All originals are lost or have been destroyed,
unless proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith; or
(2) Original not obtainable. No original can be obtained by any reasonably
practicable, available judicial process or procedure; or
(3) Original in possession of opponent at a time when an original was under the
control of the party against whom offered, that party was put on notice by the
pleadings or otherwise that the contents would be subject of proof at the hearing;
and the party does not produce the original at the hearing; or
(4) Collateral matters. The writing, recording, or photograph is not closely related
to a controlling issue."
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No testimony was presented regarding the unavailability of the original agreement, or
that the alleged agreement presented to the trial court was an exact duplicate of the
original. No testimony was presented stating that the original agreement had a Delaware
choice of law provision.
In MBNA America Bank, N.A .. v. John L. McGoldrick, Idaho Supreme Court slip
decisions, July 1 2008, the Idaho Supreme Court stated,
"The district court found that McGoldrick's original cardholder agreement "did not
have an arbitration provision, but gave MBNA the right to change the agreement
under certain circumstances." There was no evidence admitted during the trial as to
what those circumstances were or as to whether MBNA compliedwith them. Absent
that evidence, MBNA failed to prove that it amended McGoldrick's original
cardholder agreement to add a provision requiring mandatory arbitration, and it
therefore failed to prove that there was an agreement to arbitrate. The order of the
district court confirming the arbitration award is reversed."
The same basic conditions are present in this case: It is undisputed that there was no
arbitration provision in the original cardholder agreement with either Capps or Carroll.
MBNA did not admit the original agreement as evidence on the court record. There was
no evidence admitted at the hearing on an agreement to arbitrate that MBNA complied
with any terms or conditions in the original cardholder agreement in its attempt to add an
arbitration provision. There was no evidence at the hearing on an agreement to arbitrate
that there was a Delaware choice of law provision in the original cardholder agreement.
MBNA has failed to prove that it amended the cardholder agreement according to the
terms and conditions of the original cardholder agreement to include the alleged
arbitration provision. MBNA has also failed to prove that there was an agreement to
arbitrate. The trial court's decision was not based on substantial and competent evidence
and is grounds for reversible error.
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ARGUMENT IV.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING IN FAVOR OF MBNA WHEN
THE APPLICATION FOR CONFIRMATION OF AN ARBITRATION
A WARD WAS DEFECTIVE WHEN FILED?
A. INTRODUCTION

This is an action brought by MBNA to confirm arbitration awards. The Federal
Arbitration Act [FAA] specifies the necessary documents to be filed with a request to
confirm an arbitration award. MBNA did not file the required documents with the
Clerk of the Court when it filed for confirmation of the arbitration award.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Review of an arbitrator's award is limited to whether any of the grounds for relief
stated in the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) exist. Idaho Code§ 7-912(2004);
Pac. Alaska Seafoods. Inc. v. Vic Hoskins Trucking Inc., 139 Idaho 472,474, 80 P.3d
1073, 1075 (2003).
C. THE APPLICATION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD

WAS DEFECTIVE WHEN FILED

MBNA is involved in interstate commerce and it's alleged arbitration provision
falls under the Federal Arbitration Act [FAA]. The FAA in Title 9 U.S.C. § 13
requires that any motion or request for confirmation of an arbitration award inclnde
the arbitration agreement. Specifically:
"9 U.S.C. § 13. Papers filed with order on motions; Judgment; docketing; force
and effect; enforcement. The party moving for an order confirming, modifying,
or correcting an award shall, at the time snch order is filed with the clerk for entry
ofjudgment thereon, also file the following papers with the clerk:
(a) The agreement; the selection or appointment, if any, of an additional
arbitrator; and each written extension of the time, if any, within which to make the
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award.
(b) The award.
(c) Each notice, affidavit or other paper used upon an application to confirm,
modify, or correct the award and a copy of each order of the court upon such an
application."

MBNA did not file the arbitration agreement, or any agreement, with the clerk when it
filed for confirmation ofthe award (R. Vol. I, p. 386-89).
MBNA has failed to file the agreement with the request for confirmation in other
cases as well. The arbitration agreement was not present in MBNA America Bank, N.A.
v. Credit (R. Vol. I, p. 216-220) when MBNA filed for confirmation of the award letter,
and was a major factor in the court's rejection of the arbitration award. The Kansas
Supreme Court case closely parallels this case, as does the Kansas Uniform Arbitration
Act closely parallel the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act. While the Kansas case is not
binding on an Idaho court, this court may find its decision and reasoning compelling.
In Credit (supra), the Kansas Supreme Court stated (R. Vol. I, p. 219),
"As mentioned above, MBNA failed to attach a copy of the arbitration agreement
to its motion to confirm the award. This violated the Federal Arbitration Act for
which MBNA intermittently expresses respect. See 9 U.S.C. § 13 (2000). This
alone would have justified the district court in its decision to deny MBNA's
motion to confirm the award."
"Finally we note that a panel of our Court of Appeals has reached a similar
conclusion on similar facts in another case involving MBNA's efforts to arbitrate
a dispute. See MBNA America Bank v. Barben, No. 92,085, unpublished opinion
filed May 20, 2005. We also note that these Kansas cases appear to reflect a
national trend in which consumers are questioning MBNA and whether arbitration
agreements exist. See e.g., MBNA America Bank, NA. v. Boata, 94 Conn. App.
559, 893 A.2d 479 (2006); MBNA America Bank, NA. v. Rogers, 838 N.E.2d 475
(Ind. App. 2005); MBNA America Bank, NA. v. Hart, 710 N.W.2d 125 (N.D.
2006); MBNA Am. Bank, NA. v. Terry, 2006 WL 513952 (Ohio); MBNA America
Bank, NA. v. Berlin, 2005 WL 3193850 (Ohio App.); MBNA America Bank, NA.
v. I'erese, 2006 WL 398188 (Texas App.). Given MBNA's casual approach to
this litigation, we are not surprised that the trend may be growing."
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Other states have determined that there is no agreement to arbitrate on the same or
similar grounds. In MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Straub, 815 NYS2d 450 (N.Y.Civ.Ct.
2006) the court likewise reti.1sed to confirm an award entered on behalf of MBNA, where
MBNA failed to submit evidence sufficient to permit the court to conclude that a binding
credit card agreement with an arbitration provision existed. The court explained that,
under either state law or the FAA, submission of the alleged agreement was necessary but not sufficient - for confirmation. Rather, if a credit card contract is not signed by the
cardholder, the bank must provide evidence, in the form of an "affidavit of a person with
personal knowledge" presenting "the relevant documents and supporting proof" to
demonstrate how the agreement became binding. See also MBNA America Bank, N.A.
v. Forsmark, 2005 WL 2401444 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2005); MBNA America Bank,
N.A. v. Boata, 94 Conn.App. 559, 893 A.2d 479; and, MBNA America Bank, N.A., v.
Berlin, 2005 WL 3193850 (Ohio App. 9 Dist.).
MBNA's application for confirmation did not have the agreement filed with it,
consequently depriving the trial court ofjurisdiction. The trial court should have
dismissed MBNA's claim either sua .1ponte, or when Capps and Carroll brought the issne
up in reconsideration. To decide this case in favor of MBNA when the application was
defective on its face was reversible error.
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ARGUMENTV.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE ARBITRATION
PROVISION, WHICH WAS ADDED BY A NEGATIVE OPTION WITHOUT
EFFECTIVE NOTICE, DID NOT VIOLATE BASIC CONTRACT
PRINCIPLES, WAS SUBSTANTIALLY AND PROCEDURALLY
CONSCIONABLE?
A. INTRODUCTION

This is an action brought by MBNA to confirm arbitration awards. MBNA claims
to have unilaterally amended the cardholder agreement under the laws of Delaware to
include an arbitration provision. Capps and Carroll have argued that the laws of the
State of Idaho apply, not the laws of the State of Delaware. MBNA's interpretation
of the laws of the State of Delaware make the application of Delaware law
substantially and procedurally unconscionable in the State ofldaho.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Review of an arbitrator's award is limited to whether any of the grounds for relief
stated in the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) exist. Idaho Code§ 7-912(2004);
Pac. Alaska Seafoods, lnc. v. Vic .Hoskins Trucking Inc., 139 Idaho 472,474, 80 P.3d
1073, 1075 (2003).
C. THE NEGATIVE OPTION AND THE LACK OF EFFECTIVE NOTICE

The four required elements of contract formation are: (l) Agreement (includes an
offer and an acceptance), (2) Consideration, (3) Contractual capacity, and (4)
Legality. Modification of an agreement requires the same essential elements. Even if
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the addition of an arbitration provision is a modification to an existing agreement, the
agreement to arbitrate is treated as a separate and distinct agreement.
In a misinterpretation of Delaware statute Title 5 § 952, MBNA attempts to use
the notification scheme for increases in the rate or rates of periodic interest specific to
subsection (b) as a justification for adding new terms under subsection (a), in an
apparent attempt to bypass the requirement to obtain the conscious and express
consent of the cardbolder. MBNA offers the cardholder the option of refusing the
changes in subsection (b) regarding changes in interest rates by sending a written
statement to that effect to MBNA (opting out). The cardholder not writing to MBNA
and specifically rejecting the offor to amend allegedly accomplishes the supposed
modification of the agreement without actual consent. This has become known as the
negative option. No such opt-out provision is present in subsection (a) of§ 952 of the
Delaware statute.
In addition, subsection (a) of§ 952, Delaware Code, states,
"Unless the agreement governing a revolving credit plan otherwise provides, a
bank may at any time and from time to time amend such agreement in any
respect, whether or not the amendment or the subject of the amendment was
originally contemplated or addressed by the parties or is integral to the
relationship between the parties."

MBNA did not place the original agreement on the record, so the trial court had
no means of determining whether the revolving credit plan originally agreed to by
Capps and Carroll either otherwise provided for, or did not otherwise provide for such
changes. As such, MBNA, and the trial court's reliance on the Delaware statute is not
based on sufficient and competent evidence, and constitutes reversible error.
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MBNA further attempts to use continued use of the card as an act on the part of
the cardholder to indicate assent to the proposed arbitration clause. If a cardholder is
aware of the proposed arbitration clause, and agrees to the arbitration, the cardholder
will continue to use the card. !fa cardholder is unaware of the proposed arbitration
clause, and would not agree to it if they were aware of the proposed arbitration
agreement, the cardholder would continue to use the card. The proposed act to
indicate assent is ambiguous, and thus ineffective. The act of the cardholder must be
specific to the proposed amendment. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section
18, Manifestation of Mutual Assent (c), states;
"A 'manifestation' of assent is not a mere appearance; the party must in some way
be responsible for the appearance. There must be conduct and a conscious will to
engage in that conduct. Thus, when a party is used as a mere mechanical
instrument, his apparent assent does not affect his contractual relations." "This is
true even though the other party reasonably believes that the assent is genuine."

For example, if a cardholder filed an arbitration claim against MBNA that would be a
clear act in recognition of the agreement to arbitrate. Continued normal use of the
card cannot be construed as assent to the proposed arbitration provision.
The "notice" referred to in the Delaware statute is not the amendment itself, but
rather a notice of an offer to amend. Such an offer is dependant on the conscious
recognition and acceptance of the offeree as required in the Common Law of
Contracts.
As this proposed Arbitration agreement follows from the Federal Arbitration Act
[FAA] and involves interstate commerce, it is important to consider what the Federal
courts have said in this regard. It should be noted here that the FAA was intended;
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"to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to
place arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts." Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24, 111 S.Ct 1647, 1651, 114 L.Ed.
2d 26 (1986).

As other Federal courts have noted;
""a party will suffer irreparable harm if compelled to arbitrate in the absence of
any agreement to do so." GTMF v. TKN Sales, Inc., 2000 WL 364871, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2000) rev'd on other grounds, 257 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2001);
Mount Ararat Cemetery v. Cemetery Workers & Greens Attendants Union, 975
F.Supp. 445,446,447 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Cent. Life
Assurance Co., 879 F.Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) rev's on other grounds, 85 F.3d
21 (2d Cir. I 996)."

"The FAA policy in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses does not come into play in
determining whether an agreement to arbitrate exists." Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 175
F.3d 325,329 (4 th Cir. 1993); Va. Carolina Tools, Inc. v. lnt'l Tool Supply, Inc., 984 F.2d
th

113, 117 (4 th Cir. 1993); Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal. App. 4 779, 790, 79 Cal. Rptr.
2d 273, 280 (1998). "The question of whether parties have entered into an agreement to
arbitrate is resolved through application of state contract principles that govern the
formation of any contractual agreement." See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,
514 U.S. 938. 944, 1 l 5 S. Ct., 1920, 131 L.Ed. 2d 985 (1995). "The policy favoring
arbitration cannot displace the necessity for a voluntary agreement to arbitrate." Victoria
v. Super. Ct., 40 Cal. 3d 734, 739, 222 Cal. Rptr. I, 710 P.2d 833 (I 985). 'To apply the
policy in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses to the question of whether an agreement to
arbitrate exists, "would permit the presumption to displace the fundamental rule that
parties can be required to arbitrate only that which they have agreed to arbitrate.""
Hendrick v. Brown & Root, Inc., 50 F.Supp. 2d 527, 538 (E.D.Va. 1999).
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Specific to the present case, as explained in Myers v. MBNA America, 2001 WL
th

965063 (D.Mont.), the 9 Federal District Court in Montana held.
"MBNA proposed the Arbitration Section as a change in the terms of the parties
relationship that would be effective unless rejected by the cardholder. In other
words, MBNA skipped offer and went straight to acceptance. Myers did not
perform an act and did not forego the performance of an act. It should here be
plainly set forth that an offeror has no power to cause the silence of the offeree to
operate as an acceptance when the offeree does not intend it to be so. The
offeree's conduct, coupled with the silence[,] may be such as to make the silence
operative. The offeror's own language or other conduct may be such as to make
the offeree' s silence a sufficient acceptance binding on the offeror. But an offeror
cannot, merely by saying that the offeree's silence will be taken as an acceptance,
cause it to be such. The offeror cannot force the offeree to take pen in hand, to
use a postage stamp, or to speak, under penalty of being bound hy a contract by
not expressing a rejection. Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts§ 3.18 (1993 &
Supp. Fall 2000), at 407-08."
"Circumstances may indicate that the offeree accepts the offer. See id. at 40205. However, the only circumstance in this case that might indicate Myers'
acceptance is her failure to notify MBNA of her rejection. That circumstance is
dismissed by Perillo and by common sense. MBNA could argue that it gave up
its right to a jury trial in exchange for Myers' doing the same. However, this is
not evidence that anything was "bargained for." In sum there is no indication that
Myers agreed to arbitrate the dispute with MBNA."

MBNA generally argues that the cardholder "agreed" to any changes it makes in the
future as part of the cardholder agreement. Myers also addressed this argument,
"lfMBNA's argument that Myers "agreed" to arbitration when she agreed to
allow MBNA to amend the agreement were accepted, there would be no reason to
stop at arhitration. MBNA could "amend" the agreement to include a provision
taking a security interest in Myers' home or requiring Myers to pay a penalty if
she failed to convince three friends to sign up for MBNA cards. Such provisions
were as much within the agreement of the parties at the outset of their relationship
as the arbitration provision." In conclusion, the court held, "Absent
circumstantial evidence that Myers accepted MBNA's offer to arbitrate their
disputes, the arbitration Section cannot be enforced against Myers. Nor can her
agreement to arbitrate be implied from her agreement to agree to MBNA's
amendments."
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MBNA has presented no evidence whatsoever ofa "meeting of the minds",
conscious knowledge of the offer to amend on the part of either Capps or Carroll, nor any
evidence of Capps' or Carroll's agreement to arbitrate. The alleged addition of the
arbitration clause is a parole modification. In Scott v. Castle, 104 Idaho 719, 662 P.2d
1163, the Idaho Supreme Court held that;
"Parties to a written contract may modify its terms by subsequent oral agreement
or may contract farther with respect to its subject matter; however, one party to a
contract cannot alter its terms without assent of the other and minds of the parties
must meet as to any proposed modification, and fact of agreement may be implied
from a course of conduct in accordance with its existence and assent may be
implied from acts of one party in accordance with terms of change proposed by
the other."

In the State of Idaho,
"Generally, silence and inaction, or mere silence or failure to reject offer when it
is made, does not constitute acceptance of offer, absent specific exceptions to rule
which may be used to create contract." Vogt v. Madden, 713 P.2d 442, 110 Idaho
6, Idaho App. (1985). "Silence or failure to reject an offer usually is not evidence
of intent to accept the offer, except if offeror has stated or given offeree reason to
understand that assent may be manifested by silence or inaction, and offeree in
remaining silent and inactive intends to accept the offer." Eimco Div. Envirotech
Corp., v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 672, 109 Idaho 762, Idaho App. 1985.

Capps and Carroll were not aware of any alleged contract modification regarding
arbitration, there was no conscious knowledge of a proposed arbitration clause, there was
no "meeting of the minds" regarding arbitration or its addition to the existing contract
between Capps, Carroll and MBNA (seeaffidavits-R. Vol. I,p. 314-315 and 311-312
respectively). There was no intent on the pait of Capps or Carroll to accept any
arbitration agreement with MBNA by remaining silent or inactive. Capps and Carroll
have not acted in a manner consistent with arbitration being a part of the contract. Since
the act must be consistent with the proposed change, the only act Capps and Carroll could
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have performed that would be consistent with an arbitration provision would have been to
file an arbitration claim against MBNA. No such act was performed.
Even in Delaware, a "meeting of the minds" is required and a clear understanding of
the agreement is necessary. In Hieman Abner & Goldlust v. Ingram, C.A. No. 96C-05047, SUPERIOR COURT OF DELAWARE, KENT, 1998 Del. Super. LEXIS 251, April
23, 1998, the Delaware court held that,
"[2] It is of course, elementary that where a contract is sought to be made in the
form of an offer and an acceptance, there is no meeting of the minds unless the
acceptance is of the identical thing offered." (See also Mesa Partners v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., Civil action No. 7871, COURT OF CHANCERY OF
DELAWARE, NEW CASTLE, 488 A.2d 107; 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 540; and
Martin Newark Dealership, Inc., v. Grube, C.A. No. 97-11-064 COURT OF
COMMON PLEAS OF DELA WARE, NEW CASTLE, 1998 Del.C.P. LEXIS 2).

Because there was, and is, no meeting of the minds regarding arbitration, there is no
agreement to arbitrate this, or any, dispute between Capps, Carroll and MBNA.
Other companies have tried to use similar ineffective notice schemes used by MBNA.

In Ting v. AT&T, 182, F.Supp.2d 902 (N.D.Cal. 2002) also 319 F.3d 1126, discovery
revealed that AT&T had commissioned a survey to determine the percentage of people
who actually looked at the contents of the envelopes that they received. In the AT&T
case, attorney Paul Bland with Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, commissioned a study
with Lake, Snell, Perry & Associates to conduct original research regarding the AT&T
notice of arbitration, the number of people who saw it, and the number of people who
actually read and understood it. The results of the Lake Snell study were presented to the
trial court (R. Vol I, p. 245 to 275).
In Ting the court evaluated the Lake-Snell survey. The Ting court stated, (at 28, p.
912)
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"While I attach less weight to the responses to questions 2-3 and 11, since the form of
the questions could have been improved, I could not ignore th@ clear trend of these
answers, which indicate that people are unlikely to read solicitations received in the
mail, even if from AT&T. Nor could l ignore their consistency with the results of
AT&T' s research."
The conclusion of the Lake-Snell survey, regarding the arbitration provision, stated, (R.
Vol. I, p. 249, L. 3-8)
"Finally, even after being reminded of the agreement, customers overwhelmingly
believe they have not agreed to this provision. Ninety-four percent of customers
say they have not agreed to this provision or are unsure (74 percent haven't
agreed, 20 percent don't know). Only six percent of customers think they have
agreed to this provision. Across demographic groups nearly nine out of ten
customers say they have not agreed to this provision."
AT&T' s notice of the arbitration provision was mailed in a separate envelope, most of
which were marked "Important Notice". MBNA, by mailing out their notice of the
arbitration provision as a bill stuffer, even though authorized by a Delaware statute, either
knew, or should have known, that its notice would not be seen by a vast majority of its
customers. Reliance on the bill stuffer notice for the arbitration provision as authorized
under Delaware law is unfair and unscrupulous.
The Lake Snell survey included questions on the arbitration provision included by
AT&T, as well as other contractual modifications. The results of the study indicated that
91 % either don't remember seeing an arbitration provision (85 percent) or say they are
unsure (6 percent) (R. Vol. I, p. 247). When customers were read portions of the
arbitration provision over the phone, most said they have not heard of it or don't know
(92 percent), only 9 percent said they remember reading or seeing it (R. Vol. I, p. 248).
The Lake Snell study is generally consistent with the original AT&T study. The bottom
line regarding MBNA 's use of a bill stuffer for notice of the addition of an arbitration
provision to their cardholder agreement is that 7 out of 8, to 9 out of IO people did not
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read or understand the notice. Such a notice has come to be referred to as a "stealth"
notice, because even though it may have been sent out, most people never see it or hear
about it. Under these conditions, MBNA's alleged notice of the arbitration provision and
the opt-out provision cannot be considered effective notice.

In Lea Tai Textile Co., v. Manning Fabrics, Inc., (S.D.N.Y.) 411 F. Supp. 1404, the
federal conrt held,

"If a party wishes to bind another to arbitrate, that pnrpose must be accomplished
in such a way that each party fully and clearly comprehends that an agreement to
arbitrate exists."

MBNA, in using the "stealth" notice approach, and requiring an opt-out notification
to keep an amendment from becoming effective (the negative option), clearly has tried to
keep as many people as possible from realizing that MBNA was attempting to change
their agreement. It is impossible to establish that each party fully and clearly
comprehends that an agreement to arbitrate exists when MBNA either knew, or should
have known that from 87% to 91 % of their cardholders were not going to read the notice
or the proposed amendment. This act, on the part of MBNA, while on the surface
appears to be authorized by a Delaware statute, must still be considered deceptive and
misleading. For the trial court to conclude that an agreement to arbitrate exists under
these conditions is clearly reversible error.
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ARGUMENT VI.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ALLOWING CAPPS' AND CARROLL'S
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY
(CONCERNING THE ORIGINAL DISPUTE) TO BEWAIVED THROUGH A
"NEGATIVE OPTION" WITHOUT CAPPS AND CARROLL BOTH
KNOWINGLY, lNTELLEGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY CONSENTING TO
THE WAIVER?
A. INTRODUCTION

This is an action brought by MBNA to confirm arbitration awards. The waiver of
a substantive and constitutionally protected right cannot be waived with voluntary,
intelligent and knowing consent. Mailing an alleged notice as a bill stuffer does not
act as a waiver of this substantive and protected right.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Review of an arbitrator's award is limited to whether any of the grounds for relief
stated in the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) exist. Idaho Code§ 7-912(2004);
Pac. Alaska Seafoods, Inc. v. Vic Hoskins Trucking Inc., 139 ldaho 472,474, 80 P.3d
1073, 1075 (2003).
C. THE FALSE WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY .JURY

"The FAA policy in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses does not come into play in
determining whether an agreement to arbitrate exists." Carson v. Giant Food. Inc., 175
F.3d 325,329 (4 th Cir. 1993); Va. Carolina Tools, Inc. v. Int'! Tool Supply, Inc., 984 F.2d
113, 117 (4 th Cir. l 993); Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal. App. 4 th 779, 790, 79 Cal. Rptr.
2d 273,280 (1998). "The question of whether parties have entered into an agreement to
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arbitrate is resolved through application of state contract principles that govern the
formation of any contractual agreement." See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,
514 U.S. 938. 944, 115 S. Ct., 1920, 131 L.Ed. 2d 985 (I 995). "The policy favoring
arbitration cannot displace the necessity for a voluntary agreement to arbitrate." Victoria
v. Super. Ct., 40 Cal. 3d 734,739,222 Cal. Rptr. 1, 710 P.2d 833 (1985). "To apply the
policy in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses to the question of whether an agreement to
arbitrate exists, "would permit the presumption to displace the fundamental rule that
parties can be required to arbitrate only that which they have agreed to arbitrate.""
Hendrick v. Brown & Root, Inc., 50 F.Supp. 2d 527,538 (E.D.Va. 1999).
Because one party claims that an agreement to arbitrate exists does not
automatically waive the other party's right to a jury trial. There must, in fact, be a
voluntary agreement to arbitrate the dispute. MBNA's bill stuffer notice of their
arbitration provision is not an actual agreement to arbitrate, but rather is being used to
imply that an agreement may exist, since there is no actual evidence of a meeting of the
minds or any evidence of an intelligent, knowing and voluntary waiver of Capps' and
Carroll's right to a trial by jury. In Van Vranken v. Fence-Craft, 91 Idaho 742,745,430
P.2d 488 (1967), the Supreme Court ofidaho held,
"[2] The right to trial of issues by jury rests on a constitutional base. Idaho Const.
Art. 1, § 7 (Farmer v. Loofbourrow, 75 ldaho 88,267 P.2d 113, deeided under
former I. C. § RJ0-301). The waiver of such right cannot be made or enforced
unless it appears to have been made in conformity with existing statute or rule,
and not by implication. Farmer v. Loofbourrow, supra; Meal v. Drainage Dist.
No. 2, 42 Idaho 624,248 P. 22. See also: Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy, 301
U.S. 389,393, 57 S.Ct. 809,812, 81 L.Ed. 1177 (1937), (where the United States
Supreme Court stated: "[T]he right ofjury trial is fundamental(;]. courts indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver."); Lee Wing Chau v. Fusae K.
Nagai, 353 P.2d 998 (Hawaii, 1960); Mozes v. Dam, 4 Ariz. App. 385,420 P.2d
957 (1966); 5 Moore's Fed.Practice ,i 38.43, p. 335; 31 Am.Jur., Jury,§ 47, p. 51;
50 C.J.S. Juries§ 110, p. 821."
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Since MBNA's claim of an arbitration agreement flows from the Federal
Arbitration Act [FAA], the claimed "waiver" of Capps' and Carroll's right to a trial by
jury is also relevant under federal law. In Jackson v. Maxwell, 262 F.Supp. 494 (l 966),
the United States District Court, District ofldaho, S. D. held,
"A waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right. In federal law, there
exists a strong presumption against the waiver of constitutionally guaranteed
rights. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, and Glasser v. United States, supra. To be
effective, a waiver must be shown to have been knowingly and understandably
n1ade. '

1

Capps and Carroll, in their Post-Hearing Memorandum (R. Vol. I, p. 169), raised
the issue ofMBNA's alleged arbitration clause waiving a constitutionally protected right,
specifically the Seventh Amendment Right to a Trial by Jury. While the decisions of
other state supreme courts is not binding, this court may find the reasoning compelling.
Arbitration agreements in medical clinic practice are routinely signed by the patient, and
yet, as the Supreme Court of Nevada held in Obstetrics and Gynecologists Wixted,
Flanagan and Robinson v. Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259,
"The contents of both affidavits are perfectly consistent with the conclusion that
the agreement was never explained to respondent. On these facts the district court
may well have found that respondent did not give an informed consent to the
agreement and that no meeting of the minds occurred."
The court decided that the arbitration clause, even though signed by the patient, was not
valid due to the lack of a clear understanding of the arbitration provision where there was
no "meeting of the minds".
In a similar case, Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix, Ltd., 173 Ariz. 148,
840 P.2d 1013 ( 1992), the Supreme Court of Arizona also held that the signed arbitration
agreement was not valid by stating,
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"The facts in the instant case present an even stronger argument in favor of
holding the agreement unenforceahle than do the facts in Pepper. In both cases,
plaintiffs stated that they did not recall signing the agreement to arbitrate or
having it explained to them." "Clearly, there was no conspicuous or explicit
waiver of the fundamental right to a jury trial or any evidence that such rights
were knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived."
Even in the dissenting opinion, the justices clearly stated,
"The dissent is concerned that our decision today sends a 'mixed message.' It is,
however, our intent to send a clear message. That message is: Contracts of
adhesion will not be enforced unless they are conscionable and within the
reasonable expectations of the parties. This is a well-established principle of
contract law; today we merely apply it to the undisputed facts of the case before
us."

See also Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 299 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 1996 Utah LEXIS 83
(1996).
Capps and Carroll had no expectation that MBNA would seek to remove their
constitutionally protected right to a trial by jury by including an alleged notice as a bill
stuffer in a monthly statement. Here there is no signed arbitration agreement; only
MBNA's claim that an agreement exists because they sent out a notice as a bill stuffer in
a monthly statement. Such alleged notice is not a knowing, voluntary, intelligent waiver
of a substantive right. The trial court erred in allowing the waiver of Capps' and
Carroll's substantive right to' a trial by jury without substantial and competent evidence
that such a waiver was actually made.
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CONCLUSION
The evidence presented clearly demonstrates: that the alleged arbitration
agreement was not properly formed, that the dependence on Delaware law was not valid,
that there was no meeting of the minds on the issue of arbitration, and that the method of
creating the alleged arbitration agreement is in violation of several fundamental public
policies of the State ofldaho. In addition, the method of delivering the alleged notice of
an arbitration provision did not rise to the legal level of effective notice, and the method
of notification of the alleged arbitration provision does not rise to the level of a waiver of
a constitutionally protected substantive right. The trial court's decision that an agreement
to arbitrate exists and to confirm the arbitration award letters is clearly wrong and must
be reversed. In Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Peterson, 102 Idaho 111,626 P. 2d 767
( 1981 ), the Supreme Court of Idaho held,
"Where the findings of a trial court are clearly erroneous, we must set them aside.
I.R.C.P. 52(a); Marshall Bros., Inc. v. Geisler, 99 Idaqho 734, 588 P.2d 933
(1978); Russ Ballard v. Lava Hot Springs Resort, Inc. 97 Idaho 572, 548 P.2d 72
(1976)."
Capps and Carroll request that this court reverse the judgment of the district court,
vacate the award letters against them, and remand for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this

fj If(

day of September 2008.

Miriam G. Carroll, Appellant, in propria persona
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